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App deployment & isolation

Concept

When you register a new app in Greenlight, the platform creates a dedicated place for it to run — separate from every other app in your organization. If the app needs a database or object storage, the coding agent requests those resources and Greenlight provisions them with scoped credentials.

The app brings the code; Greenlight brings isolation boundaries, the image registry, network policy, workload identity, and lifecycle management.

Per-app isolation diagram: every app gets its own boundary. A namespace panel (gl-app-slug) contains the at-registration resources — Kubernetes namespace, deployment boundary with a stable app URL, per-app image repository, per-pod rotated workload identity, and NetworkPolicy + ResourceQuota with default-deny traffic and capped CPU, memory, and storage — plus a when-the-app-needs-storage cluster with a Postgres database (DATABASE_URL) and a SAS-scoped blob storage container. Permitted flows are drawn as solid arrows: in from the SSO-enforced ingress controller (the only way in) and out to the data broker (governed egress, the only way out). Denied-by-default flows are drawn as crossed red dashes: other apps' namespaces (no cross-namespace traffic) and public internet egress (default-deny outbound).

Every registered app gets these resources, provisioned in your cloud subscription. The app never holds cloud admin credentials.

ResourceWhat it gives the appWhat it isolates
Kubernetes namespace (gl-app-<slug>)The boundary the app’s pods run in.No cross-namespace traffic; no cluster-level RBAC.
Deployment boundaryA governed place to build, deploy, and reach the app at its org subdomain after the first successful deploy.Each app’s runtime and URL are separate from other apps.
Image repositoryThe built container image is pushed here on every pipeline pass.One repository per app; pull credentials are managed by the platform.
NetworkPolicyIngress from the SSO-enforcing controller plus narrowly selected Greenlight verification and imagery services; egress to the data broker and the app’s own resources.A compromised app cannot pivot to other apps, the control plane, or the public internet.
ResourceQuotaA namespace-level CPU, memory, and storage ceiling.One app’s load can’t starve others.
Workload identityThe credential the app uses to authenticate to the data broker.Per-pod, signed by the cluster, rotated automatically. Never stored in app source code.

If the app needs durable data, the coding agent asks Greenlight to add a database, file storage, or both:

ResourceWhat it gives the appWhat it isolates
Postgres databaseDurable storage, injected as DATABASE_URL.A scoped database user; the app cannot see other apps’ databases. Private network path only.
Object storage containerBlob storage for uploads, exports, and backups.Credentials are bound to this container; the app cannot list or read other apps’ storage.

Greenlight creates the resources, mints scoped credentials, and injects connection settings into the running app. Local development can use the same data when your org allows it; see App environment variables. Later deploys reuse the same storage.

greenlight.yml in the app repo holds identity and documentation — not a list of infrastructure to provision. Agents configure resources through the MCP tools reference.

Dedicated resources move with the app through the governed deployment lifecycle.

StatusNamespacePostgresObject storageImage repo
RegisteredCreatedWhen requestedWhen requestedCreated on first build
Building / DeployingPreparing rolloutPreparingPreparingBuilding image
Active / DegradedRunningActiveActiveActive
FailedPreserved for retryPreservedPreservedPreserved
SuspendedScaled to zeroPreserved, idlePreservedPreserved
DeletedDeletedDroppedDeletedDeleted

Restore from suspended brings the app back with its data intact. Delete is the permanent retirement path: runtime resources are torn down and the source repo is archived (not deleted) to preserve history. A configurable retention window that holds the database for a recovery period before dropping it is planned but not yet available.

The NetworkPolicy attached to every app namespace allows these platform-controlled flows and blocks the rest:

  • Ingress is permitted only from the cluster’s ingress controller, which terminates TLS and enforces SSO before traffic reaches an app pod.
  • Internal verification and imagery are admitted only from the Greenlight control-plane server and renderer pod identities. This lets the agent verify a deployed response and lets Greenlight capture app imagery without opening app-to-app traffic.
  • Egress to the data broker for any upstream HTTP call. Apps cannot reach SaaS APIs directly.
  • Egress to the app’s own Postgres on the database port, via a private endpoint inside the cluster’s VNet.

Everything else — pod-to-pod across namespaces, public-internet egress, the cloud metadata service — is blocked at the policy layer.

Each namespace gets default CPU, memory, and ephemeral-storage caps configured by IT in the org policy bundle. Apps that need more than the defaults file a request through the dashboard, which an IT admin approves and which is then captured as a policy override in the audit log.